And what are the likely implications for their exit from the regional political and economic union?
In a significant shift in West African Geopolitics, the countries of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have officially withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This move marks the end of a year-long diplomatic effort and the beginning of a new era for regional integration and politics in the Sahel. The development, which was announced on January 29, 2025, stems from a series of events characterized by military takeovers, shifting alliances, and a growing critique of ECOWAS’s policies towards some of its member states.
Why did they leave?
The decision to leave ECOWAS by the three countries, all of which are currently under military rule following coups, was not sudden but the culmination of a series of events and escalating tensions. But the primary catalyst can be traced back to the manner in which ECOWAS’s responded to the coups in these countries:
The role of sanctions
After the coups in Niger in July 2023, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Mali in 2020, ECOWAS imposed severe sanctions on the three countries including border closures, no-fly zones, and asset freezes. These were particularly harsh on Niger. From the perspectives of the military Juntas which were behind the coups, these sanctions were seen as inhumane and punitive and they accused ECOWAS of failing to understand the drivers for the coups, and the disenfranchisement of citizens by their former governments, and failing to adequately support their respective security challenges against jihadist threats.
Perceived Western Influence
The juntas have criticized ECOWAS for being too closely aligned with Western powers, particularly France, which you may know has a long history of colonial and post-colonial influence in West Africa. The military leaders have had a unified view that the bloc’s operations prioritises foreign interests over those of its member states. Over time this has led to calls for greater sovereignty and independence.
Alliance of Sahel States (AES)
In September 2023, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as a way to address some of their grievances in the form of a a mutual defense pact following the 2023 Nigerien crisis ECOWAS had threatened to intervene militarily to restore civilian rule after the coup in Niger the same year. This new bloc sought closer ties with Russia for military support and potentially with other non-Western countries (Iran, Turkey and China) for economic partnerships.
The juntas argue that ECOWAS did not provide adequate support in dealing with the existential threats of terrorism and insecurity in their countries, and which were among the drivers cited for the respective coups that took place. When it was formed, the AES was presented as a more direct and effective approach to regional security issues without the bureaucratic or political constraints associated with ECOWAS.
Implications of the Withdrawal from ECOWAS
The departure of these three countries from ECOWAS has far-reaching implications. Firstly, the withdrawal might lead to a fragmentation of security efforts in the Sahel, where coordinated action against terrorism has been crucial. The AES might form its own security strategies, potentially less aligned with international norms or Western interests, possibly leading to increased instability if not managed well.
ECOWAS provides a framework for free movement of goods, services, and people, which has been beneficial for trade and economic growth. These countries also share a currency, the France-backed CFA Franc. The withdrawal means these countries could lose direct access to the ECOWAS market, which could mean increased transaction and logistical costs and hinder economic development unless alternative trade arrangements are effectively established, so there is likely to be an economic impact. However, both ECOWAS and the AES have stated intentions to keep doors open for continued trade and movement, although it remains to be seen what arrangement are negotiated and how they will work. Further, it is likely that the AES will form it’s own monetary union and withdraw from the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and stop using the CFA Franc, so that too will have an impact.
Political Repercussions
The exit challenges ECOWAS’s standing as the leading political authority in West Africa. It might encourage other member states especially those feeling disenfranchised by ECOWAS’ policies to consider similar actions, potentially leading to further fragmentation. Although this may also have a positive effect and force ECOWAS to reform its approach to governance and membership. There is also an international dimension to this point in that this shift could signal a broader realignment of international relations in West Africa, with countries possibly seeking new partners for security, economic, and political support. The pivot to Russia for military aid by the AES is a clear indicator of changing geopolitical dynamics, which might inspire other African nations to diversify their international relations, looking not just to Moscow, but also to Beijing.
Humanitarian Impact
The sanctions imposed by ECOWAS had already caused significant humanitarian issues in these countries, particularly in Niger. As the International Crisis Group stated in December of 2023:
But ECOWAS and Tinubu appear to have overshot the mark. Although the ECOWAS sanctions sent a strong signal of disapproval concerning coups and have undoubtedly created external pressure on Niger’s generals, they have also backfired in ways relevant to both Niamey and Abuja. They have created severe hardship in Niger with adverse boomerang effects on Nigeria – crippling a vibrant cross-border economy straddling the long Nigeria-Niger border, disrupting livelihoods, exacerbating humanitarian challenges, and jeopardising big rail and gas projects that could bolster regional trade. On the political front, the sanctions threaten to harm bilateral cooperation on a range of important issues, particularly security.
ECOWAS, Nigeria and the Niger Coup Sanctions: Time to Recalibrate, Nnamdi Obasi,
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate
Thus, the formal exit might lead to a reevaluation of aid and development programs, potentially affecting millions of citizens if not managed properly.
There are also potential legal implications regarding the rights of citizens, like the validity of ECOWAS passports. While both ECOWAS and the AES have expressed intentions to maintain certain privileges like free movement, yet how this will be function in practice remains to be seen.
The formalization of this exit could either be seen as a step towards greater self-determination or as a move that might isolate them from regional solidarity and support. The coming months will be critical in observing how these countries navigate their new path outside of ECOWAS, AND how ECOWAS itself responds and maps regional cooperation after this loss of membership, considering the manner challenges in the region.
Chad, another country which shares a border with Niger, and which has close ties to Russia, has signaled it’s intention to join the AES. Last year in May, Chad joined Togo, in joint military exercises alongside the AES to enhance the operational skills and resilience of their armed forces, against common threats like the jihadists which have been launching terrorist attacks in the region. Thus, as the situation evolves, the international community will be monitoring closely to see the balance between sovereignty, security, and regional integration in one of the world’s most geopolitically complex areas.
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